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Abstract
This paper uses a computable general equilibrium model to evaluate the
implications of trade agreements and a tax reform for the Brazilian economy.
The model predicts that welfare gains will happen whether the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA henceforth) is implemented or Argentina simply
reduces the tariﬀs it still placed on Brazilian products in 1997. However, the
welfare gains are much larger when the FTAA is implemented. If the FTAA
is implemented simultaneously to a reduction on domestic consumption taxes,
the Brazilian gains will be even larger. The model also suggests that most of
the Brazilian welfare gains arise from the reduction of Brazilian tax and tariﬀs.
Reductions of tariﬀs that destination countries place on Brazilian exports have
small welfare eﬀects.
Keywords: trade blocks, tax reform, welfare.
JEL: D58, F11, D69
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the post World War II the commerce of good and services has increased steadily.
At the same time, the world has seeing the formation of trade blocks where a group of
countries agree to adopt free trade policies among themselves. Bergoeing and Kehoe
[1] provide some evidence on these facts.
A debate has surrounded the formation of each block. Is it better for a country
to join a trade union or not? This debate is of particularly interest in a region like
1Latin America where the countries have generally followed what is known in the
literature as Import Substitution Policies. In short, these policies consist of closing
the internal market, protecting it against external competition and, simultaneously,
giving subsidies for ￿rms to produce for the internal market.
In a moment where the countries of the whole American continent are getting
ready to start discussing the formation of FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas)
the importance of studying the consequences of the formation of these blocks on the
Brazilian economy speaks for itself. What are the gains to join the FTAA? What are
the consequences?
Brazilian entrepreneurs pointed out some problems to join the FTAA. They claim
that is diﬃcult to compete with the US economy in a free trade zone, among other
things, because the Brazilian tax system. Brazil taxes heavily labor input using a
cascade taxation system that increases the cost and the prices of Brazilian goods.
Since the other countries do not use these taxes, the Brazilian entrepreneurs claim
that Brazil should reform its tax system before joining the FTAA.
In this paper we try to assess these issues quantitatively. Given the size of the US,
to study the consequences of joining the FTAA is basically to study the consequences
of joining the US economy. Therefore, we adopt a four-country (Argentina, Brazil,
US and rest of the world) model to evaluate the impacts of trade blocks and taxation
policies on the Brazilian economy.
The use of general equilibrium model to evaluate alternative policies is today a
common practice. Kehoe and Kehoe [12] and Kehoe and Kehoe [13] provide a survey
on the subject. Some authors, as Gonzaga, Terra e Cavalcante [8] and Cavalcante
and Mercenier [4], have used general equilibrium models to evaluate the impact of
the Mercosur on the Brazilian economy.
We speci￿ed our model at a very basic level. Family units were described by
preference relations and budget sets. Firms are described by their production set
and pro￿t functions. The advantage of specifying the model at this structural level,
instead of describing just a set of demand and supply functions, is that this procedure
allowed us to carry out welfare implications in an unambiguous way.
We should stress some limitations of our model. First, we are using a static model.
In this case, we are not allowed to say anything about the transition path from one
stead state to another. Second, we are problem underestimating the impacts of the
FTAA. As pointed out by several authors (for instance, Kim [14] and Tybout and
Westbrook [22]), trade liberalization is often followed by with an increment in the
total factor productivity (TFP). Since our model is static, we cannot capture this
increment. This change in the TFP would increase productivity, reduce price and
increase trade and the welfare eﬀects of the formation of trade blocks.
We carried out three experiments. In the ￿rst one we set the bilateral tariﬀsf o r
the pair Brazil/Argentina equal to zero. We call this experiment Mercosur. The
idea behind this experiment is to quantify the impacts of a reduction of the trade
barriers that were raised by the Argentinian government in the last three years. In
2the second experiment we set all import tariﬀs between Argentina, Brazil and the
US equal to zero. This experiment we call FTAA. As we said before, the reason to
call this experiment FTAA is that the impacts on the Brazilian economy of joining
the FTAA (all American countries) should be very close to the impact of joining a
free trade zone with the US. In the last experiment, we combine the previous policy
change with a reduction in the Brazilian domestic taxes on domestic consumption.
All these experiments point toward welfare gains for the Brazilian economy. These
gains are very modest in the ￿rst and in the second experiment but it is sizable in
the last one. This results pointed for a small impact of the FTAA in the Brazilian
economy in the static environment used here.
Besides the three experiments described above, we considered also the case in
which the US import tariﬀs on Brazilian goods were initially higher than the US
weighted average tariﬀ that we computed. The reason to carry on this experiment is
motivated by the fact that the US has non tariﬀ barriers (NTBs) in many sector as
steel, sugar and orange juice (besides the huge volume of subsidies paid by the US
government to the agriculture sector). Therefore, the eﬀective average tariﬀ of the
US economy on Brazilian goods is higher than the one that we computed. Since we
could not compute a tariﬀ adjusted for the NTBs, we redid the three experiments
explained above using for the US the same average tariﬀ placed by the EU on Brazilian
goods. We then performed exactly the same three experiments. The impacts over
the Brazilian economy were roughly the same. In particular, the welfare gains were
virtually unchanged.
The computational experiments we performed suggest that most of welfare gains
for the Brazilian people arise from the reduction the Brazilian tariﬀs and domestic
taxes rate. This ￿nding has a striking policy implication. Brazil should open to trade
and carry out a tax reform regardless its trade partners proceed in the same way or
not.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we described the model econ-
omy. In section 3 we de￿ne competitive equilibrium. In section 4 we explained our
calibration procedure. In section 5 we report and analyze the results of the experi-
ments. Section 6 concludes. A balance-of-payments issue is discussed in the appendix
(section 7).
2T h e e c o n o m y
There exist four countries: Brazil (b), Argentina (a), US (u), and the Rest of the
World (r). The set of countries is represented by I = {a,b,r,u}. Each country
produces a tradable and a non-tradable good. These goods are country speci￿c.
Each nation i has a representative agent endowed with ﬂ ki units of capital and one
unit of time that she can allocate to market and non market activities (call it leisure).
Capital is mobile across countries but labor is not.
3Let cij denote the amount of the tradable good produced by country i and con-
s u m e di nc o u n t r yj; ci denotes the non tradable good of country i.T h ec o m m o d i t y
space is L = I R13. A generic point in L is denoted by x,
x =( caj,c bj,c rj,c uj,c a,c b,c r,c u,l a,l b,l r,l u,k)
where j ∈ I, cij i st h eg o o dp r o d u c e di nc o u n t r yi and exported to country j; ci is
the nontradable good produced by country i, li is amount of labor input in country i
and k is the capital stock.
The consumption set of a consumer in country i ∈ I is
Xi = {x ∈ L+ : li ≤ 1; ki ≤ ﬂ ki; cj = lj =0 forj 6= i} (1)
where li is the amount that a consumer from country i ∈ I allocates to work. ki is
the amount of capital services that a consumer rent to ￿rms, given that this consumer
has ﬂ ki units of capital services to be rented.
2.1 Preferences


















where αai + αbi + αri + αui =1 , cij is the good consumed by the representative
consumer in country i produced in country j; ci is the nontradable good of country
i, li is the amount of the consumer time allocated to work.
2.2 Technologies
In each country ￿rms operate two technologies. One that produces the non tradable
good and one that produces the country speci￿c tradable good.
The production set of the non tradable good of country i ∈ I is
Yi(n)={y ∈ L+ : yi ≤ k
θl
1−θ
i ;yj = lj =0 , for j 6= i;yij =0 }
The production set of the tradable good of country i ∈ I is
Yi(t)={y ∈ L+ : yii ≤ k
ϕl
1−ϕ
i ;yij = yj = lj =0 , for j 6= i}.
The technological parameters satisfy θ,η ∈ (0,1).
2.3 Government Consumption and Taxes
Government i levies proportional taxes at rate τji on the imports from country j 6= i,
at rate τii on the consumption of the domestic goods and at rate τli on labor income.
The government uses the ￿scal revenue to purchase some amount gi of its country
non-tradable good.
43 Competitive Equilibrium
A tax system for country j ∈ I is a vector τj =( τaj,τbj,τrj,τuj,τlj). An international
tax system is an object τ =( τa,τb,τr,τu). Each component of τ is a tax system for
a country. A price system for this economy is a vector
P =( pat,p bt,p rt,p ut,p a,p b,p r,p u,−wa,−wb,−wr,−wu,−r).
We are abusing notation, since prices of a non tradable good from other countries are
in￿nity. But this abuse make our notation easier and homogeneous across countries.
The coordinates of P are before tax prices. An after tax price system for a country i
is a vector
Pi =( pai,p bi,p ri,p ui,p an,p bn,p rn,p un,−pal,−pbl,−pul,−prl,−r).
The typical consumer from county i ∈ I solves the following problem
max
x∈Xi
u(x) s.t. Pi • x ≤ 0








De￿nition 1 A competitive equilibrium for an international tax system τ is an array h
P,(Pi,x i,y in,y it)i∈I
i
such that:
1. given P, yin and yit solve the problem of the respective ￿rm;
2. given Pi, xi solves the maximization problem of consumer i;
3. P, Pi and τi satisfy (1 + τai)pat = pai, (1 + τbi)pbt = pbi, (1 + τri)prt = pri,
(1 + τui)put = pui, (1 + τii)pi = pin,a n d(1 − τli)wi = pil.
4. each government balances its budget, that is,




5. (xi,y in,y it)i∈I is feasible, that is,



















5One may wonder why a balance-of-payment constraint was not considered in the
above de￿nition. It is shown that the conditions spelled out in de￿nition 1 imply that
each country satis￿es its balance-of-payment constraint.
4 Calibration
The following list of parameters have to be calibrated: αj, αaj, αbj, αrj, αuj, γ,
ﬂ kj, θ, ϕ, τaj, τbj, τrj, τuj, τlj. We calibrated the model to match some features of
US, Brazil, Argentina and the rest of the world economy in 1997. Our procedure is
detailed below.
Following Kydland and Prescott [16], we set γ =2 /3. We borrow from Rebelo
[19] and Rebelo and Vegh [20] the shares θ =0 .37 and ϕ =0 .52.
To calibrate the trade tariﬀs we proceeded as follows.
1. US:
We used the data provided by the US International Trade Commission to calcu-
late the weighted average tariﬀ imposed on Brazilian, Argentinian and an Rest
of the World. Weights were by given the participation of each good in the total
trade with the respective country. The values we obtained are τau =1 .94%,
τbu =2 .52% and τru =2 .01%.
2. Brazil and Argentina:
We took simple average of Mercosur tariﬀ information provided in Gonzaga,
Terra e Cavalcante [8]. The values we obtained are τba =9 .3%, τra = τua =
18.4%, τab =0and τrb = τub = 23%.
3. Rest of the world:
We took simple average of the European Union tariﬀs provided in Lejour, Mooiji
and Nahuis [17] to set τur =4 .32%. We picked an weighted average tariﬀ
provided by Castilho [6] to set τar = τbr =8 .1%.
To calibrate the tax rates on labor income and domestic consumption, we took
the steps detailed below.
1. US:
Mendonza, Razin and Tesar [18] estimated tax rates on labor income and con-
sumption for several OECD countries. In an updated version of their work
(which is available at www.econ.duke.edu/~mendonzae), they provided esti-
mates for these variables for 1996. We used their ￿gures to set τlu =5 .467%
and τuu =2 7 .733%.
62. Brazil:
We used the calibration carried out by Rosal and Ferreira [21] to set τlb = 18%.
The paper on tax incidence of Siqueira, Nogueira and Souza [24] led us to set
τbb =1 6 .2%.
3. Argentina:
Bulacio [3] estimated τla =2 3 .61% and Zee [28] estimated τaa = 21%.
4. Rest of the world:
The updated version of Mendonza, Razin and Tesar [18] provides average la-
bor income and average consumption taxes ￿gures for Canada, France, Ger-
m a n y ,I t a l y ,J a p a n ,a n dU n i t e dK i n g d o m . U s i n gP P PG D P ￿ sa sw e i g h t s ,w e
took weighted average of these countries taxes and obtained τlr =3 6 .39% and
τrr =9 .31%. Note that these countries amount for 75% of world￿s PPP GDP
(excluded US, Brazil and Argentina).
To calibrate the αj￿s and αij￿s we proceed as follows.
1. αj:
For Brazil, US and Argentina we set αj to be equal to ratio of each country￿s
service output to its GDP. This data is provided in the World Development
Report 1998/99 [26]. This procedure yielded αa = 63%, αb =5 0 %and αu =
72%. To calibrate αr we used the formula
αr =
αwYw − αaYa − αbYb − αuYu
Yw − Ya − Yb − Yu
=0 .5992,
where Yw is the world￿s GDP and αw the world￿s services output as fraction of
Yw (both αw and Yw are provided in the aforementioned publication and Yj is
country￿s j GDP. To round oﬀ,w ep i c k e dαr = 60%.
2. αaj,αbj,αrj,αuj:
To explain how we calibrated these parameters, we will take Argentina as our
example. The same procedure was used for Brazil and US. From the Argen-







In the above expression, pmtcma is the value of Argentina￿s import from coun-
try m and paca is equal αaYa (see the above section). We computed prtcra as
a residue. That is, let Ma be value of Argentinian total imports. Therefore,
prtcra = Ma − pbtcba − putcua. The IMF￿s Direction of Trade Statistics [11]
7provides the ￿gures for Ma, pbtcba and putcua.W e o b t a i n e d αba ∼ = 0.0516,
αra ∼ = 0.1425 and αua ∼ = 0.0497.S i n c e αaa + αba + αra + αua =1 ,t h e n
αaa ∼ = 0.7561. By taking the same steps for Brazil and US, we got αab ∼ = 0.0178,
αbb ∼ = 0.8374, αrb ∼ = 0.1063, αub ∼ = 0.0386, αau ∼ = 0.0011, αbu ∼ = 0.0045,
αru ∼ = 0.3952,a n dαuu ∼ = 0.5992.T oo b t a i nαar, αbr, αrr,a n dαur, an additional
step was required. By taking the Brazilian, Argentinian and American total
exports and subtracting the value each of them exported to the other two we
computed the amount each of these countries exported to the Rest of the World,
as well as the total imports of the Rest of the World. With these information
at hand, we applied the procedure detailed above. This led to αar ∼ = 0.0020,
αbr ∼ = 0.0048, αrr ∼ = 0.9109,a n dαur ∼ = 0.0823. As a minor comment, we re-
p o r t e dt h ev a l u e sh e r eu s i n gt h e￿ ∼ =￿ because they were computed with more
than four decimal places.
To calibrate the ﬂ kj￿s we proceed as follows.
1. US:
According the World Development Report [26], US￿s GDP was equal to US$
7,745,705 million in 1997. Cooley and Prescott [5] estimated that US￿s capi-
tal/output ratio is close to 3.32. We use these information to set ﬂ ku =3 .32 ￿
7,745,705 ￿ 106.
2. Brazil and Argentina:
Using the data on GDP and GNP at current dollars and PPP GNP dollars pro-
v i d e di nt h eW o r l dD e v e l o p m e n tR e p o r t[ 2 6 ] ,o n ec a ne s t i m a t e dt h eP P PG D P
for both Brazil and Argentina. We obtained Y PPP
a ∼ = 374,776.415 million and
Y PPP
b ∼ = 1,037,130.429 million. Bugarin et alii [2] estimated a capital/output
ratio of 2.3 for the Brazilian economy. We then set ﬂ kj =2 .3Y PPP
j for j = a and
j = b.
3. Rest of the World:
We used the procedure mentioned at the previous item to ￿nd out that Y PPP
r ∼ =
10,971,817.488 million. We assumed that the rest of the world has the same
capital output ratio as the US. Hence, ﬂ kr =3 .32Y PPP
r .
5T h e R e s u l t s
The goal of this section is to evaluate welfare consequences and real eﬀects of trade
agreements and a tax reform for the Brazilian economy. To carry out this task,
we proceeded in the following way. First we computed the competitive equilibrium
associated to the parameters we calibrated in the previous section. This equilibrium
8is going to be our benchmark. We then computed the competitive equilibrium for the
three distinct international tax systems and compared the outcomes.
Recall that the calibrated tariﬀ and tax rates for Brazil, Argentina and USA are
as follows:
TABLE I
CALIBRATED TARIFFS AND TAX RATES - % VALUES
.
Country Argentina Brasil Rest of the World USA Labor Income Tax
Argentina 21 9.3 18.4 18.4 23.61
Brazil 0 16.2 23 23 18
US 1.94 2.52 2.01 5.467 27.733
Each line indicates how a country taxes the domestic goods and the goods pro-
duced by other countries, as well as the income tax on the country￿s labor income.
In the ￿rst experiment we simply drop τba from its original value to 0. Observe
that in this model economy a complete implementation of the Mercosur amounts to
set both τab and τba equal to zero. Since the original (i.e., the calibrated) value of τab
is zero, we denominated this experiment Mercosur.
In the second experiment we set τba = τua = τab = τub = τau = τub =0 .T h i s
amounts to set all intra-America trade tariﬀs in the model equal to zero. Therefore,
we denominated this experiment FTAA.
The third experiment combines the FTAA with a reduction of the consumption
taxes in Brazil. We dropped τbb from its original value of 16.2% to 5.467% (the level
observed at the United States). We called this experiment FTAA with tax reform.
The main results are presented in Table II.
We measured the welfare gain using equivalent variation as percent of benchmark
GDP. All other ￿gures in the table are percent changes from the benchmark compet-
itive equilibrium.
The equivalent variation is a standard measure of welfare gains and/or losses in
general equilibrium analysis. Let p0 be price vector faced by the Brazilian consumer
and u0 the utility level she obtained before the reform. Let u1denote the after reform
utility level and E(p,u) the expenditure function. The equivalent variation is given
by E(p0,u 1)−E(p0,u 0). Observe this diﬀerence tells how much income the consumer
would need, at the benchmark prices, to obtain the after reform utility. For more on
the equivalent variation and other welfare measures, see Varian [27].
Consider the Mercosur experiment. The Brazilian trade de￿cit falls 2.39%. All
other variables change by less than 0.2%. A factor behind the small impact of a drop
in τba over the Brazilian economy is relative size of the countries. The Brazilian GDP
is almost three times the Argentinian GDP. So, it is not surprising that the tariﬀ
drop did not have large impacts over the Brazilian economy.
A striking feature of the Mercosur experiment is the modest welfare gain. Kehoe
and Kehoe [13] stated that ￿because Mexico￿s economy is the smallest, it will enjoy
9the biggest NAFTA-produced increase in economic welfare￿ and ￿NAFTA￿s impact
on the United States, although positive, is barely perceptible as a percentage of GDP.￿
So, our ￿nding is perfectly consistent with earlier studies.
Despite the small impact of the drop in τba over the Brazilian economy, the Mer-
cosur experiments has some insights. Since both kbn and kbt went up, the Mercosur
generated a capital ￿o wt oB r a z i l .T h ep h y s i c a lo u t p u tw e n tu pi nb o t hs e c t o r s .T h e
amount of time worked went up. But the amount of labor in the non-tradable sector
went down. So, there was some reallocation of resources across the two sectors of the
Brazilian economy. The consumption of all goods increased. The real GDP went up.




reform Mercosur FTAA FTAA with Tax Reform
cab +0.18 +0.01 -0.97
cbb +0.01 -0.10 +9.76
crb +0.05 -0.34 -1.32
cub +0.05 +22.56 +21.35
cb +0.00 -0.02 +10.08
lb +0.02 -0.16 -0.63
lbn -0.02 -0.42 -5.48
lbt +0.11 +0.42 +10.13
kbn +0.06 -0.91 -7.34
kbt +0.19 -0.08 +7.97
kbn + kbt +0.12 -0.54 -0.38
ybn +0.01 -0.60 -6.17
ybt +0.15 +0.16 +9.00
GDP at benchmark prices +0.06 -0.32 -0.52
trade de￿cit -2.39 +10.88 +7.80
consumer price index +0.04 -0.69 -9.84
real wage (net of taxes) +0.04 +0.16 +8.71
real private income (net of taxes) +0.01 +0.32 +9.41
welfare gain (% of GDP) +0.00 +0.10 +2.42
The FTAA experiment generates an increase of 10.88% in the Brazilian trade
de￿cit. The welfare gain is 0.10% of the benchmark GDP. This is still a modest
￿gure, but by far larger than the Mercosur one. The Brazilian consumption of the
American tradable good (cub) increases by 22.56%. All other variables change by less
than 1%. So, except for the trade balance and cub, the FTAA has small impacts over
the variables.
Observe that both cab and cub went up, while lb, cb, cbb and crb fell. The Brazilian
consumer substituted away from the domestic good and the rest of the world tradable
10good and toward leisure, cab and cub. There was an reallocation of labor from the
non-tradable to the tradable sector of the Brazilian economy. Capital utilization went
down in both sectors. So, a capital out￿ow took place. The tradable output went up,
while the non-tradable one went down. Both GDP and CPI went down. Real wage
and real private income experienced an increase.
We do not report these data here, but it is worth to mention that the FTAA
has negligible eﬀects over the rest of the world. Particularly, krn and krt are roughly
constant. Recall that in our arti￿cial economy there is a ￿xed capital stock. Since
there is no capital out￿ow or in￿ow to the rest of the world, the FTAA generated an
reallocation of the capital within Argentina, Brazil and US.
The Mercosur experiment showed that when a trade tariﬀ τij is reduced, capital
￿ows from country j to country i. In the FTAA experiment, several τij￿s were simul-
taneously reduced. Thus, it is not possible to anticipate which country should receive
or send capital abroad. It turned out that United States received capital, while Brazil
and Argentina lost.
This result about capital deserves more attention. Evidence in the EU indicates
that the capital movement goes from the rich countries (in this case the US) to
the poor countries (Argentina and Brazil) during this episodes of formation of trade
blocks. Kehoe and Kehoe [13] discuss in the detail the issue of capital ￿ows in models
of trade agreements. They show that larger welfare gains take place when there is
a capital ￿ow. However, any static model will hardly generate a capital ￿ow from a
richer to a poorer country. What drives the capital movement is the capital rate of
return. Hence, a possible way that a model can generate a capital ￿ow to a poorer
country is by means of a productivity increase.
Kim [14] provides evidence that trade liberalization had a positive impact on the
productivity of Korean manufactures. Tybout and Westbrook [22] shows that similar
event took place in Mexico during the trade liberalization of the 90￿s. Herrendorf
and Teixeira [7], Holmes and Schmitz [9] and Holmes and Schmitz [10] shows, under
a theoretical point of view, why trade liberalization may have a positive impact over
a country productivity.
Despite not capturing the productivity surge and capital ￿ow associated to a
international trade opening process, the model still predicts welfare gains in both
Mercosur and FTAA experiments. We believe that these welfare we computed are
lower bounds. We anticipate that a more sophisticated model will display even larger
welfare gains.
Another point to be discussed is the observed GDP fall in the FTAA experiment.
That fall was driven by a drop in ybn. Observe that when the Brazilian government
reduces tariﬀs and tax rates there is a fall in the government ￿scal revenue. This will
lead to a fall in gb and a consequent fall in ybn.
The aforementioned fall in gb brings an important point to light. A reduction
of tax burden, as was done in the above experiments, has to be accompanied by
a reduction in the government expenditures. An interesting exercise would consist
11in open the Brazilian economy to international trade and raise some tax rates to
compensate for the tariﬀ reduction. This exercise is left for future research.
The FTAA with tax reform experiment generate a huge welfare gain (when com-
pared to the previous two). There is a gain of the order of 2.42% of the GDP. The
Brazilian consumer substituted away from cab and crb toward cbb, cub, cb and leisure.
Recall that our model is static. Thus, statements about capital ￿ows have to be
evaluated with care. Anyway, it is interesting to see that in the FTAA experiment
the sum kbn +kbt went down by 0.54%, while in the last experiment it went down by
a smaller amount (0.38%). Hence, the third experiments suggests that a tax reform
may help Brazil to attract capital.
There was a ￿ow of production factors to the tradable sector. Both lbt and kbt
went up. Resources left the non tradable sector. As a consequence of this reallocation
of resources, ybt grew and ybn fell.
The fall in the GDP was larger than in the FTAA experiment. Again, this fall
was driven by the reduction in gb.T h et r a d e d e ￿cit increased, but less than in the
FTAA simulation. On the other hand, the decrease in the CPI and the increase in
the net real wage and net private income were by far larger.
Now, lets analyze the last experiment carried on in this paper. The calibrated
value of τbu was 2.52%. As mentioned in section 4, this number is a weighted average of
tax rates on Brazilian exports to US. This procedure does not take into consideration
non tariﬀ barriers, as quotes. So, the eﬀective tariﬀ rate is clearly higher than 2.52%.
To address this issue, we proceed as following: we assume that τbu was equal to 8.1%
(which is the average tariﬀ that the European Union place on Brazilian products)
and run the three experiments again. Surprisingly, the results did not change much.
We report them below.
T h en u m b e r sa r ee x t r e m e l ys i m i l a rt ot h o s eo fT a b l eI I .I nt h ep a r t i c u l a rc a s eo f
the welfare gains, the diﬀerences are negligible. This ￿nding has a striking policy
implication. The model suggests that most of the gains Brazil can obtain from a
trade agreement arise from the reduction of the Brazilian tariﬀs. More speci￿cally,
a unilateral reduction of the Brazilian tariﬀs would increased the welfare. Besides, if
this unilateral reduction of tariﬀs are also followed by a tax reform, the welfare gains
would be substantial.
The result is not a surprise if we look at the tariﬀsi m p o s e db yt h eU So nt h eg o o d s
imported from the Brazil. Even when we increased this average tariﬀ from 2.52% to
8.1% this tariﬀ is still small when compared to the taxation that Brazil imposed on the
consumption of the domestic good. That is, the distortions that the US government
places is to small compared to the distortion introduced domestically. Therefore,
substantial welfare gains can be obtained by a unilateral reduction of Brazilian taxes
and tariﬀs.
We also should keep in mind that we must be underestimating this results since
we are working on a static model. Tax reduction should increase private income and
private investment raising the gains computed above.
12TABLE III
EXPERIMENTS￿S RESULTS FOR A HIGHER
INITIAL US TARIFF ON BRAZILIAN GOODS
.
reform Mercosur FTAA FTAA with Tax Reform
cab +0.18 +0.07 -0.91
cbb +0.01 -0.08 +9.77
crb +0.05 -0.28 -1.27
cub +0.05 +22.63 +21.42
cb +0.00 -0.02 +10.09
lb +0.02 -0.13 -0.61
lbn -0.02 -0.44 -5.50
lbt +0.11 +0.55 +10.26
kbn +0.06 -0.85 -7.27
kbt +0.19 +0.13 +8.20
kbn + kbt +0.12 -0.40 -1.10
ybn +0.01 -0.59 -6.16
ybt +0.15 +0.33 +9.18
GDP at benchmark prices +0.06 -0.25 -0.45
trade de￿cit -2.33 +8.00 +5.00
consumer price index +0.04 -0.64 -9.79
real wage (net of taxes) +0.04 +0.20 +8.75
real private income (net of taxes) +0.01 +0.34 +9.43
welfare gain (% of GDP) +0.00 +0.10 +2.42
6C o n c l u s i o n
A small scale general equilibrium model was used to evaluate the impact of trade
agreements and tax reforms over the Brazilian economy. The main ￿nding is that
most of the welfare gains arise from the reduction of Brazilian domestic taxes and
import tariﬀs. A reduction of trade tariﬀs charged by foreigners on Brazilian goods
do not have large welfare eﬀects on the Brazilian families.
The tariﬀ and tax reductions performed in this paper were not compensated by
an alternative source of revenue for the government. Consequently, the government
real expenditure was reduced in most of the experiments. An interesting exercise
would consist in carry out a tariﬀ reduction compensated by a tax burden increase in
another sector of the economy so that the government revenue would remain constant.
The model used in this essay is a static one. Consequently, there is no capital
accumulation. Additionally, neither a tariﬀ reduction nor a tax reform induces any
productivity gain. A obvious venue for future research is to evaluate the impacts
of the trade agreements and tax reforms in a dynamic model in with endogenous
productivity gains, as in Herrendorf and Teixeira [7] and Holmes and Schmitz [9].
137 Appendix
W ew i l ln o ws h o wt h a td e ￿nition 1 implies that each country will satisfy its balance-
of-payment constraint. Therefore, it is not necessary to introduce any balance-of-
payment constraint in the set of equations that characterize the competitive equilib-
rium.
Recall that a single period economy is being considered. Hence, there is a market
for capital services but not a market for capital stock. Thus, the balance-of-payment
constraint in this economy is simply the current account component of the balance-
of-payments.
The balance-of-payment equation of a country can be easily derived from de￿nition
1. Without loss of generality, consider Argentina (country a). The budget constraint
of the Argentinian consumer is
(1 + τaa)patcaa +( 1+τba)pbtcba +( 1+τra)prtcra+
(1 + τua)putcua +( 1+τaa)paca =( 1− τla)wala + rﬂ ka.
Using the market clearing condition lan + lat = la and the Argentinian government
budget constraint paga = τlawala+τaapatcaa+τbapbtcba+τraprtcra+τuaputcua+τaapaca,
the above equation can be written as
patcaa + pbtcba + prtcra + putcua + pa(ca + ga)=
wa(lan + lat)+r(kan + kat)+r(ﬂ ka − kan − kat).
Since each production function displays constant returns to scale, pa(ca + ga)=
walan+rkan and pat
P
j caj = walat+rkat. Combine the last three equations to obtain




caj + r(ﬂ ka − kan − kat).
Cancel the identical terms out to obtain
pat(cab + car + cau) − (pbtcba + prtcra + putcua)+r(ﬂ ka − kan − kat)=0 .
The ￿rst term in the above sum is the value of the Argentinian exports. The
second is the value of the imports. The third is the capital income that Argentinians
receive from abroad (or pay, if the term is negative). Hence, the above constraint
states that the Argentinian current account must have a zero balance. As explained
above, this is exactly the Argentinian balance-of-payment constraint.
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